In the modern scenario, the protection of human rights has found its rightful place in international law. It has been a revolutionary reform, as it had no significant place a few decades ago. The international law applicable to armed conflicts (also called international humanitarian law) and the international law of human rights are the two branches of public international law and have the same general purpose: the protection of human beings. They have evolved separately while supporting the same idea for a long time. While the former has been developing for over a period of hundred years, the latter has been an active component of the international community for only half a century. Today, however, there can no longer be any ambiguity concerning their interaction and their complementary nature in this regard.
[...] But even if they could be of a great interest, like the possible implementation of international humanitarian law through human rights bodies, wouldn't it more useful to draft a new instrument combining all the relevant rules, such as a third Additional Protocol Cf. Robert Kolb, "The Relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law: a brief history of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions", International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC), n°324, pp. 409-419. Jean Pictet, "International humanitarian law: definition", in International dimension of humanitarian law (Henry Dunant Institute, 1988), introduction. [...]
[...] One may hope that the new European Court of Human Rights will also consider the utility of the laws of war in its upcoming case law. Conclusion The question of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international law of human rights has been a tremendously long debate. Nowadays there can no longer be any doubt concerning their complementary nature. Internal disturbances are among the most complex problems. In such grey zones the application of either international law of human rights or international humanitarian law is quite a confusing matter. [...]
[...] Hector Gros Espiel, "Human rights and international humanitarian law", in Bulletin of Human Rights 91/1, (United-Nations, New York, 1992) . Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vité, "International humanitarian and human rights law", IRRC, 293, pp. 94-119. See supra note 1. Fritz Kalshoven, Constraints on the waging of war (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1991), p Raùl Emilio Vinuesa, "Interface, correspondence and convergence of human rights and international humanitarian law", Yearbook of International humanitarian law (1998). The Corfu channel, I.C.J. [...]
[...] After a long and detailed study of the facts and the rules, the Commission stated that international humanitarian law was directly applicable to the case. In paragraph 162 of its report the Commission explained: 162. ( ) [The] Commission's competence to apply humanitarian law rules is supported by the text of the American Convention, by its own case law, as well as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Virtually every OAS member state that is a State Party to The American Convention has also ratified one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and /or other humanitarian law instruments. [...]
[...] Its decision was based on the absence of a "formal and public act of derogation which is one condition underlying the application of article 15. Mr. Sperduti, joined by Mr. Trechsel, dissenting on the absurdity of this conclusion, gave hope for a future recognition of the use of the law of armed conflicts: "It is to be noted that the rules of international law concerning the treatment of the population in occupied territories (contained notably in The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949) are undeniably capable of assisting the resolution of the question whether the measures taken by the occupying power in derogation from the obligations which it should in principle observe - by virtue of the European Convention - where it exercises (de jure or de facto) its jurisdiction, are or are not justified according to the criterion that only measures of derogation strictly required by the circumstances are authorized . [...]
Lecture en ligneet sans publicité !
Contenu vérifiépar notre comité de lecture